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Abstract
Adversarial interactions against politicians on social media
such as Twitter have significant impact on society. In par-
ticular they disrupt substantive political discussions online,
and may discourage people from seeking public office. In this
study, we measure the adversarial interactions against candi-
dates for the US House of Representatives during the run-up
to the 2018 US general election. We gather a new dataset con-
sisting of 1.7 million tweets involving candidates, one of the
largest corpora focusing on political discourse. We then de-
velop a new technique for detecting tweets with toxic con-
tent that are directed at any specific candidate. Such tech-
nique allows us to more accurately quantify adversarial in-
teractions towards political candidates. Further, we introduce
an algorithm to induce candidate-specific adversarial terms
to capture more nuanced adversarial interactions that previ-
ous techniques may not consider toxic. Finally, we use these
techniques to outline the breadth of adversarial interactions
seen in the election, including offensive name-calling, threats
of violence, posting discrediting information, attacks on iden-
tity, and adversarial message repetition.
Introduction
The growing trend of incivility in online political discourse
has important societal ramifications (Astor 2018; Amnesty
International UK 2018). The negative discourse is discour-
aging politicians from engaging in conversations with users
on social media (Theocharis et al. 2016), has caused some
candidates to drop out of races (Astor 2018), and has un-
known impact in terms of chilling others from engaging in
democracy. Within a large body of recent work on online
abuse and harassment, there is increasing interest in under-
standing and measuring abuse towards political figures (Gor-
rell et al. 2018b; Hua, Naaman, and Ristenpart 2020).
In this work we focus on improving the understanding of
online adversarial interactions in political contexts, using as
a case study the 2018 midterm elections for all 435 seats in
the US House of Representatives. We broadly define adver-
sarial interactions as messages intending to hurt, embarrass,
or humiliate a targeted individual. Such behaviors include
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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explicitly abusive or harassing language targeted at a candi-
date as well as more implicit actions aiming to discourage
or discredit individuals, for example posting misinformation
and subtle personal attacks. To perform this analysis, we col-
lect a dataset of tweets, retweets, mentions, and replies in-
volving a set of 786 candidates over several months leading
up to the US House election. With 1.7 million tweets, the
resulting dataset is one of the largest datasets available of
directed social media interactions with political candidates.
Analyzing adversarial interactions in such a large dataset
faces several challenges. The sheer size of the data requires
scalable, automated detection approaches. However, detec-
tion approaches used in previous measurement studies are
often based on either language models trained on a corpus
with little social context (Mondal, Silva, and Benevenuto
2017; Salminen et al. 2018) or explicitly offensive lexi-
cons (Gorrell et al. 2018b), thereby focusing on the severity
of the language used in messages. As a result, these context-
agnostic language-based approaches may miss certain kinds
of adversarial actions that don’t include severe language.
Further, these detection techniques (Yin et al. 2009; Nobata
et al. 2016; Wulczyn, Thain, and Dixon 2017) often assume
the toxicity in the interaction is directed towards the receiver.
For example, previous work (Gorrell et al. 2018b) assumed
all Twitter replies with toxic content are directed at the ac-
count being replied to, which as shown below may lead to
over-counting the amount of abuse received by some indi-
viduals. In this work, we first examine and improve on the
precision of automated language-based techniques. We then
explore, using a new method, what kinds of adversarial in-
teractions these techniques may overlook.
Our first goal is to characterize adversarial interactions
against political candidates with the above challenges in
mind. We build on existing techniques that provide high pre-
cision and scalable toxicity detection to explore the candi-
date attributes–including gender and affiliated party–that are
associated with the amount of adversarial interactions can-
didates receive. To help with this task, we use the interac-
tion context to design heuristics in order to infer the direc-
tion of toxicity: given an utterance and its receiver (e.g. the
account that was replied to or mentioned in a tweet), de-
termine if the utterance contains toxic content directed at
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the receiver. A key insight is that we can leverage the par-
tisan nature of US politics for this analysis. Specifically, we
combine Perspective API (Jigsaw 2018), a state-of-the-art
language-based toxicity detection tool, with heuristics that
predict political leaning of the users to help determine the
likely target of the abuse. We show that using these heuris-
tics improves the precision of harassment detection directed
at candidates compared to using Perspective API alone.
While the precision is high, the potential downside of us-
ing general language models trained in different context is
low recall. In order to examine the limitations of general
language models in this specific context (i.e. discourse with
political candidates), we provide a new approach for discov-
ering target-specific adversarial lexicons that uses the politi-
cal network context and a label propagation algorithm to ex-
pose phrases that are likely to be used in an adversarial way
against a specific candidate, but are not necessarily abusive
in other contexts. Using this approach, we provide evidence
and examples of adversarial interactions missed by the gen-
eral language model approach.
In conclusion, we propose techniques that allow better
quantification of adversarial interactions towards candidates.
In addition, we design a novel discovery algorithm that ex-
poses a diverse set of “personalized” adversarial interactions
that are not detected via context-agnostic harassment detec-
tion techniques. This paper therefore provides new insights
into the nature of adversarial interactions in the important
context of online democratic processes.
Related Work
Measuring adversarial interactions. Most pre-
vious measurement studies on online abuse fo-
cus on generalized hate speech or abuser char-
acteristics (Mondal, Silva, and Benevenuto 2017;
Finkelstein et al. 2018; Chatzakou et al. 2017c;
Chatzakou et al. 2017a; Ribeiro et al. 2018;
Chatzakou et al. 2017b). Most similar to our
work, Gorrell et al. (Gorrell et al. 2018b;
Gorrell et al. 2018a) used dictionary-based method to
measure abusive replies towards UK parliament members
on Twitter, in order to understand how quantity of hateful
speech is influenced by factors including candidate gender,
popularity etc. However, the analysis ignores the fact that
in communications on Twitter, the usage of hate words in
reply tweets might not be abusive towards the recipient
being replied to. Different from previous approach, in
our analysis, we define the problem of directed toxicity
detection and develop an approach by using both content
and user features as the first attempt to address it.
Categorizing adversarial interactions. Previous works
have worked on characterizing adversarial interactions in or-
der to design better annotation schemes (Founta et al. 2018),
understand victim’s experiences (Matias et al. 2015) or to
identify different themes in generalized hate speech (ElSh-
erief et al. 2018). Unlike previous work, we focus our anal-
ysis on directed harassment towards politicians and de-
velop a framework to identify target-specific adversarial
lexicons. With our technique, we are able to discover con-
textual adversarial topics that are typically missed by ex-
isting machine learning techniques. In previous research,
categorization of adversarial interactions are often coded at
comment level (Salminen et al. 2018), and inevitably ig-
nores certain harassment categories such as sustained ha-
rassment towards individuals. In contrast, we analyze di-
rected adversarial interactions at the target level. To obtain
a more exhaustive list of types of adversarial behaviors, we
combine our categorization with typologies from research
that examined victim reported harassment (Duggan 2017;
Matias et al. 2015), and present examples in our dataset from
each category.
A Political Interactions Data Set
Data collection. Our goal is to use a data-driven approach
in order to obtain a better understanding of adversarial
interactions with political candidates online. We retrieved
the full list of candidates running in 2018 for the United
States’ House of Representatives from Ballotpedia (Ballot-
pedia 2018). We filtered out candidates who didn’t pass the
primary election (except for those in Louisiana, where the
primary election is held with the general election), resulting
in 1-2 candidates for each of the 435 congressional races.
We obtained the candidates’ Twitter accounts by manu-
ally verifying the campaign accounts listed on their Bal-
lotpedia pages and campaign websites. We included the
candidates’ personal or office accounts (for incumbents)
when found. Our final dataset includes a list of 786 candi-
dates (87% of all House candidates competing in November,
2018): 431 Democrats (D) and 355 Republicans (R) candi-
dates from all 50 states with 1, 110 Twitter accounts in total.
We obtained the gender of each candidate based on man-
ual inspection on candidate profiles. In total, our dataset in-
cludes 231 female candidates and 555 male candidates1.
We collected data from Twitter (using the Twitter stream-
ing API) from September 17th, 2018 until November 6th,
2018, including all tweets posted by, mentioning, replying
to, or retweeting any of the candidate accounts. We estimate
good coverage on all data except mentions due to the limited
access of the Twitter API. In total, our data consists of 1.7
million tweets and 6.5 million retweets of candidates from
992 thousand users (including the candidate accounts). We
publish all the tweet ids collected at Figshare 2.
On Twitter, following relationship among users has been
shown to be informative for inferring user interest or polit-
ical preference (Romero, Tan, and Ugander 2013; Barbera´
2015). We therefore retrieved the 5,000 most recently fol-
lowed accounts by each user account via the Twitter Stan-
dard API (Twitter 2019). Due to Twitter API rate limits, this
data collection was only completed by March 2019. There
are two main limitations of this network data. First, for users
who have left Twitter or set their profiles to be private at the
time of the data collection, their friends lists were not re-
trieved. Nevertheless, as we prioritized the more active users
1The account database is available at https://github.com/
vegetable68/Midterm-2018-candidates.
2https://figshare.com/articles/U S Midterm Election Twitter
Dataset 2018/11374062
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Figure 1: (a): Amount of attention received per candidate
and attention tiers separated by vertical dotted line. (b):
There’s strong correlation between amount of attention and
number of followers per candidate.
in our dataset (users who interacted more with candidates
by replying to their tweets or mentioning their accounts)
while collecting this data, we consider these omissions as
non-critical. Second, as users may follow more than 5000
accounts, or follow new accounts after their interaction with
political candidates was recorded, our data collection is not
entirely accurate. In total, we obtained full Twitter friends
list of 92% of all users in our data as they follow fewer
than 5000 accounts. Moreover, we retrieved partial friends
lists for 7% of all users who followed more than 5000 ac-
counts. The remaining 1% accounts were either deleted or
suspended at the time of our network data collection.
Additionally, we performed manual labeling for a subset
of user profiles and tweets in order to verify and improve
results of our analysis. Details of the annotation tasks are
introduced when the data is used in the following discus-
sions. We use a team of three graduate students and two re-
searchers. The labeling is done by two raters and conflicts
are resolved by the third.
Attention. Before turning to analyzing the adversarial in-
teractions, we provide some basic analysis of interactions in
the dataset. An interaction with a candidate is a tweet that
is either a reply to a tweet by the candidate, or a tweet that
mentions the candidate. We define the attention received by
a candidate to be the number of interactions towards them in
the dataset (i.e. mentions or replies). The distribution of at-
tention varies significantly across candidates. Over our data
collection period, for example, we measured 82,100 replies
to the tweets of Nancy Pelosi, while another candidate, Erika
Stotts Pearson, had a total of five.
In Figure 1, we show the distribution of attention received
by candidates (left) and the correlation between the atten-
tion and the number of followers each candidate has (right).
Clearly, the 786 candidates in our dataset receive different
levels of attention and may experience and perceive adver-
sarial interactions differently, as attention is heavily skewed
towards a few high-profile candidates and has a long tail of
candidates without much attention attracted.
Directed Toxicity Detection
Given the scale of our data, we have to rely on methods that
can scale for a quantitative analysis. To ensure the accuracy
of such methods, we first define the problem of detecting
directed toxicity within tweets. Given a tweet, a set of pos-
sible targets of abuse (recipients of, or mentions within, the
tweet), one can use both language and social clues, such as
online community structure or user social network, to de-
termine whether the tweet contains adversarial content to-
wards one or more of the target(s). In this section, we use
our dataset to show the insufficiency of adversarial interac-
tion detection approaches that lack directionality, and then
provide a new method, directionality via party preference
(DPP) as the first attempt at solving it.
Insufficiency of prior approaches. Previous work (Gor-
rell et al. 2018b) used a combination of dictionary-based
techniques and Twitter metadata, such as the fact that tweets
include mentions and replies, to infer adversarial interac-
tions. We improve on this along two dimensions, first replac-
ing dictionary-based techniques with state-of-the-art ma-
chine learning techniques, and, second, providing a more
advanced solution to the directionality problem.
We use Perspective API (Jigsaw 2018) to determine if a
tweet contains adversarial content. We use the API’s TOXI-
CITY score, which indicates whether the model believes the
utterance to be discouraging participation in conversations.
The score is a value in [0, 1], with 1 indicating high likeli-
hood of containing toxicity and 0 being unlikely to be toxic.
In order to choose a threshold with high precision in detect-
ing adversarial tweets, we created the following validation
set with 100 tweets. For each toxicity interval with length
0.1 (i.e. (0, 0.1], (0.1, 0.2], etc), we sampled 10 tweets and
asked annotators if it contains adversarial content. Annota-
tors labeled 44% of the tweets as adversarial. When choos-
ing 0.7 as the threshold, the detection has the highest preci-
sion 90% while maintaining a reasonable recall at 61%, with
F1=0.73. Therefore, in the following discussions, we choose
0.7 as the threshold for marking a tweet as adversarial. A fur-
ther validation of this threshold on the same dataset shows
that results of analysis on adversarial interactions against po-
litical candidates are robust to small changes in this thresh-
old (Hua, Naaman, and Ristenpart 2020).
One alternative approach to identify toxicity in tweets is
to classify the sentiment in their contents. However, scores
assigned by sentiment analysis are not sufficient to reflect
the adversarial-ness of tweets. To experiment, we used vader
sentiment analysis package (Hutto and Gilbert 2014) to as-
sign sentiment scores to the tweets in the above described
validation set. Given a tweet, the algorithm outputs a con-
tinuous value between [-1, 1] indicating the sentiment con-
veyed in the utterance. We chose the threshold for classi-
fying a tweet as adversarial being the threshold that makes
the highest F1 score. The resulted precision is 66% with re-
call of 78% and F1 of 0.72. We used Perspective API for
the following analysis as it has higher precision in detecting
adversarial tweets.
That leaves the second challenge, inferring directional-
ity. In our data users tend to attack a candidate’s opponent
while replying to them, making the prior approach – sim-
ply looking at the Twitter reply or mention metadata – in-
sufficient. To make this concrete, consider house candidate
Omar Navarro (R), who was running against longtime house
Any Candidate Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5
Replies Mentions (All interactions)
Adversarial tweets (manual labels) 97 94 97 92 95 93 96
Adversarial & directed at candidate (manual labels) 75 56 70 71 65 68 73
Automatically labeled by DPP 96 89 91 91 95 90 94
Adversarial & directed in DPP-labeled set (manual labels) 71 52 62 64 62 62 68
DPP precision (DPP-labeled set) 93% 68% 77% 81% 88% 84% 91%
DPP recall (DPP-labeled set) 92% 73% 85% 81% 81% 82% 90%
Table 1: Comparison of directed toxicity detection approaches. (Top) The number of tweet-candidate pairs manually labeled
as adversarial in general and adversarial towards the candidate, out of 100 tweet-candidate pairs randomly chosen from tweets
marked as adversarial by the Perspective API. (Middle) The number of tweet-candidate pairs for which we had enough informa-
tion to label via DPP across different categories, and the number of adversarial tweets directed at candidates in the DPP-labeled
sets. (Bottom) The precision and recall of the DPP method on the labeled set.
Figure 2: An example tweet from a user attacking Maxine
Waters while replying to Omar Navarro.
member Maxine Waters (D). Since Waters has been very vo-
cal in terms of her attitude towards President Trump, she at-
tracts a large amount of attacks from pro-Republican users,
even when they are replying to Navarro’s tweets. An exam-
ple of this is given in Figure 2. In a human validation of 100
machine-labeled adversarial tweets replying to Navarro, we
notice that although 91 tweets in total contain adversarial
content, only 18 of them target Navarro. In this case, the
straightforward combination of Perspective API with Twit-
ter metadata would overcount the number of adversarial in-
teractions towards Navarro.
To understand how general the overcounting problem is,
we perform an experiment with tweet-candidate pairs. We
annotate seven separate sets of 100 tweet-candidate pairs,
randomly sampled from tweets labeled as adversarial by Per-
spective API. The first set includes tweets that are replies to
any candidate, and the second set includes tweets that men-
tion any candidate. The last five sets of tweets are ones in-
teracting with candidates with different levels of popularity.
For this purpose, we divided candidates into five tiers ac-
cording to the different amount of attention they received.
Details of the grouping are shown by the dotted lines in Fig-
ure 1(a). Each tweet and candidate pair is labeled with two
questions: (1) does this tweet contain adversarial content; (2)
is the adversarial content targeting the candidate.
We present the results of the analysis in the upper section
in Table 1 (The middle and bottom section are explained
below.) The first row shows the number of tweets that in-
deed contain adversarial content. On average, Perspective
API has a precision of 95% in detecting adversarial con-
tent. The second row shows the number of tweets that are
adversarial against the candidate being replied to or men-
tioned. For just 75% of the replies and 56% of the mentions,
the tweet contains adversarial content targeting the replied-
to or mentioned candidate respectively. This precision sug-
gests that simply relying on Twitter metadata is not sufficient
in understanding the targets of adversarial content.
Directionality via party preference. We introduce a new
set of heuristics for determining if a candidate being men-
tioned or replied to is the target of adversarial content. With
the partisan nature of political discussions in the U.S., we
assume that when a candidate from one party is replied to
or mentioned in an adversarial tweet by a user that displays
an affinity for that party, it is more likely that the hostility
is actually towards the opposing candidate or party. To take
advantage of this insight, we need a way to infer a user’s po-
litical leaning, which we describe in a moment. Assume for
now we can infer a user’s party preference. Then, our direc-
tionality via party preference (DPP) method labels a tweet
as adversarial to a candidate if it is machine-labeled as ad-
versarial and the tweet’s author leans towards the political
party opposing that of the candidate.
Inferring user party preference. We now aim to infer
party preference of users. To be specific, for each user in
our dataset, we assign a party preference tag of either pro-
Democrat, pro-Republican, or unknown. The tag is assigned
combining three features: hashtags in user profiles, users’
retweet patterns and following relationships on Twitter.
(1) Hashtags in user profile: We adapt an approach
from previous work (Conover et al. 2011) to bootstrap
politically polarized hashtags in user profiles. We begin
by seeding from two highly politically polarized hashtags,
#maga (Make America Great Again, typically used by pro-
Republican users) and #bluewave (typically used by pro-
Democrat users). Then we identify a set of hashtags that are
related to the seeds by examining co-occurrence in user pro-
files. For a set of user profiles S containing a seed hashtag
s, and a set of user profiles T containing a non-seed hashtag
h, the political relatedness of h to seed hashtag s is assigned
to be the Jaccard coefficient between S and T , i.e., |S∩TS∪T |.
Using a threshold from previous work, hashtags with politi-
cal relatedness larger than 0.005 are considered related to the
seed hashtag. We populate the S and T sets with any relevant
user from our dataset, and this results in 55 and 64 hashtags
related to #maga and #bluewave respectively, with zero
overlap between the two sets of hashtags. We manually filter
out the hashtags that are ambiguous in terms of represent-
ing a political preference (for example, #israel). The full
list of politically related hashtags and the list of hashtags
used in labeling user political preference are both shown in
the Appendix. We then label users as pro-Democrat or pro-
Republican by hashtag occurrence in the user profile. Users
without any hashtags from either list or with hashtags from
both lists are labeled as unknown.
(2) Retweet pattern: Previous work (Conover et al. 2011)
shows that political retweet networks in Twitter are highly
polarized. We assign a user’s party preference by their
retweeting behavior during our data collection period. Users
are labeled as pro-Democrat if they retweet more from
Democrats than from Republicans, and labeled as pro-
Republican if it is the other way round. Users with no
retweet records or that retweet equally from both parties, are
labeled as unknown.
(3) Friendship on Twitter: Previous work (Barbera´ 2015)
used features from a user’s following relationships to suc-
cessfully predict the user’s political preference. Here we use
the same resource for the same purpose. First, we connect
user pairs with bidirectional edges if one of the two follows
the other. In our dataset, we observe that the friendship net-
work among users is separated into two communities. There-
fore, using a label propagation algorithm (Raghavan, Albert,
and Kumara 2007) that assigns community labels in a net-
work, from a seed set of users labeled by the two previously
introduced approaches (excluding users with disagreeing la-
bels), we iteratively update each user’s political preference
label according to the label that is shared by most of its
neighbors. Ties are broken randomly when they occur.
Finally, a user’s political label is assigned by the majority
vote among the three methods. In total we are able to label
98% of all users with a political leaning label. Furthermore,
for users who are relatively more active in terms of interact-
ing with candidates, it is more likely that we have enough
information to label their political preference.
Note that it is likely that some of the users captured in our
dataset are automated bots (Davis et al. 2016; Ferrara et al.
2016), or part of state-operated information operations (Im
et al. 2019; Arif, Stewart, and Starbird 2018). However, such
activity is of minimal impact on our result, as adversarial in-
teractions that are generated by bots or humans are both per-
ceived by candidates and other potential audience, with the
same negative impact. Nevertheless, we performed a more
detailed analysis of the adversarial users’ characteristics and
behaviors in (Hua, Naaman, and Ristenpart 2020). Our man-
ual validation there shows that the most active users are
unlikely to be entirely automated by algorithms. We also
compared our data with a list of state controlled accounts
with over 5,000 followers published by Twitter (Monje Jr
2019) (as the information of this set of accounts was not
anonymized): none of them showed up in our dataset.
Political preference labeling evaluation. To validate la-
bels on user political preference, we sample 100 labeled
users and at most 10 tweets from each user. We ask raters
to label each user as pro-Democrat, pro-Republican or un-
clear given the tweets and users’ profiles. Raters agree with
the machine-assigned labels for 93% of the users.
Evaluating DPP. With inferred user political preference,
we can now apply the DPP method to identify if a given
tweet is adversarial towards a candidate. We evaluate our
method on the sampled datasets in Table 1. For some of the
tweets, we are unable to collect enough user information for
political preference labeling or the content is too short to be
scored by Perspective API. Such tweets comprise 8% of all
interactions in our dataset. In the middle section of the ta-
ble, we show the number of tweet-candidate pairs that we
have enough information to label with DPP, along with the
number of adversarial tweets that are directed at the candi-
date in the labeled set. Compare to the results as shown in
the second row, the ratio of directed adversarial tweets in the
DPP-labeled set remains unchanged.
As our goal is to have a high-precision and scalable ap-
proach to quantify adversarial interactions received per can-
didates, we focus on measuring the precision of DPP in iden-
tifying directed adversarial content. For a given candidate-
tweet pair, a positive label is when the tweet is labeled
as containing adversarial content against the candidate.
The evaluation was performed on the subset of the tweet-
candidate pairs that are automatically labeled by DPP. We
define the DPP precision as the percentage of true positive
labels over all the tweet-candidate pairs that are machine-
labeled as positive. Likewise, DPP recall is defined as the
percentage of true positive labels over all the positive tweet-
candidate pairs that are manually labeled as positive. In the
bottom section of Table 1, we show the precision and recall
of DPP. We emphasize that this is only recall measured rel-
ative to the set of DPP-labeled tweets, not to the overall set
of tweets in our dataset. Since the ratio of directed adver-
sarial tweets remains unchanged in the DPP-labeled dataset
as listed in the two middle rows in the table, the baseline
approach of using Perspective API with Twitter metadata
would result in the precision as shown in the second row
(e.g., 75% for all replies). Thus our method improves over
the baseline approach across candidates with different pop-
ularity levels while achieving over 80% recall in most cases.
For all candidates, on average, the measured quantity of
adversarial interactions decrease by 36% when applying
DPP compared to using the approach of combining Perspec-
tive API and Twitter metadata. For some candidates such
as Janet Garrett (running against Jim Jordan), Andrew Janz
(against Devin Nunes), Omar Navarro (against Maxine Wa-
ters), the quantity of adversarial interactions decreases from
Regression Model Distribution Mean Standard deviation
B SE
(Intercept) 44.3 *** 2.65
Amount of attention from
users supporting opposing party
117.1 *** 7.27 2.06 0.66
Number of followers −21.0 ** 7.07 3.85 0.42
Candidate gender 4.09 5.91 30% of the candidates are female 0.7
Candidate party 4.65 6.11 59% of the candidates are Democrats 0.41
Candidate gender × party −25.3 * 12.8
R2 0.388
Significance codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Table 2: Results of regression analysis for number of adversarial tweets received by a candidate (N = 707). Log transformed
variables are listed in italic with mean and standard deviation in log scale. The histograms indicate the data distribution of
variables after standardizing.
more than 9% of all interactions towards them to less than
1.5%. The opponents of these three candidates attract sig-
nificant attention, hence a large proportion of adversarial
tweets interacting with them target their opponents.
Measuring Adversarial Interactions
Towards Candidates
With DPP, we can now quantify the scale of adversarial in-
teractions against candidates and compare the quantity of
adversarial interactions based on candidates’ characteristics,
including demographics or party affiliation.
In the following regression analysis, we show the impact
of various candidate attributes on the dependent variable –
amount of directed adversarial interactions received per can-
didate estimated by DPP. The model controls for the number
of followers a candidate has and the amount of attention the
candidate received from users who are in favor of the oppos-
ing party of them. Candidate gender and affiliated party are
represented as binary features. Variable base levels (zero)
are Democrats for party affiliation and female for gender.
We experimented with number of candidate posts and over-
all attention towards a candidate as independent variables
and excluded them because of high collinearity with the to-
tal amount of interaction a candidate attracts from users sup-
porting the opposing party.
For the regression, we excluded the top and bottom 5%
of candidates in our dataset based on the overall attention
they received. We removed the top candidates since these
candidates receive national attention, resulting in entirely
different interaction dynamic and content than those seen
with other candidates. We exclude the bottom-attention can-
didates as they do not get any attention at all (less than seven
tweets on average during that period). We ran the same re-
gression model excluding a larger set of 10%, 15% and 20%
of candidates. The results are highly similar across all these
levels, while significantly different from analysis including
all candidates.
Table 2 includes the details of the regression analysis.
Histograms in the table show the distribution of variables,
along with the mean and standard deviation (rightmost three
columns). We log-transformed the number of followers and
amount of attention from users supporting the opposing
party (listed in italic in Table 2), so that values are normally
distributed as shown in the histograms. Further, as suggested
in previous work (Gelman 2008), all continuous variables
were standardized by centering and dividing by two stan-
dard deviations in order to have the same scale for com-
parison with the binary variables, which were centered. The
standardized beta coefficients (B) and their standard errors
(SE) of both models are also presented in Table 2. The p
values are computed from two-tailed T test. For indepen-
dent variables included in both models, variance inflation
factors (VIFs) are less than 2, indicating that multicollinear-
ity is not an issue. As shown in the bottom row of the table,
our model explains R2 = 0.388 of the variance of the de-
pendent variable.
Among the variables used in the model, we can see that
the most significant predictor of adversarial interactions
against a candidate is the amount of attention they receive
from users who are in favor of the opposing party (this vari-
able was highly correlated with overall attention to the can-
didate, not used in the model, as noted above). In the model,
ten times more interactions a candidate gets from supporters
of the opposing party adds 88.7 more adversarial interac-
tions (117.1 divided by twice the standard deviation, 0.66).
We also notice that the number of followers negatively cor-
relates with the dependent variable, ten times more followers
a candidate gets decreases the number of adversarial inter-
actions by 25, when holding the other variables constant.
Other variables are not as predictive on the quantity of es-
timated adversarial interactions received per candidate. In
our dataset, the majority of all users—68%—are estimated
as pro-Democrats. When this skewed distribution of party
preference of users on Twitter is controlled via the amount
of attention coming from opponent users in the regression
analysis, the gender and affiliated party of a candidate are
not predictive of the quantity of adversarial interactions.
In conclusion, our method for directed detection of adver-
sarial interactions allows quantifying and comparing adver-
sarial interactions targeting candidates. Our findings suggest
that the overall attention to the candidates is the main pre-
dictor of adversarial interactions, and that party or gender,
for example, are not significant factors for the candidates in
our (trimmed) dataset.
Discovering Candidate-Specific
Adversarial Interactions
The analysis above focused on quantifying adversarial inter-
actions that contain toxic speech. However, as noted above,
adversarial interactions can often be very subtle and do
not necessarily contain language that can be easily flagged
by context-agnostic language-based methods. To better un-
derstand the diversity of adversarial interactions, and to
discover content that is missed by the methods based on
context-agnostic models, we develop an algorithm that can
discover target-specific adversarial lexicons. Specifically,
the algorithm assigns Adversary Scores to terms used in
interactions with a specific candidate, in order to discover
terms that are frequently used in an adversarial way towards
the candidate.
Our approach builds on previous work which identifies
domain-specific sentiment terms using a graph-based label
propagation approach called SENTPROP (Hamilton et al.
2016). Specifically, SENTPROP computes embeddings for
each word from their co-occurrences on a domain-specific
corpus and connects words that are semantically close based
on the cosine similarities of the respective word vectors. Af-
ter the graph is constructed, a subset of words is initialized
from a seed set as having positive or negative polarisation.
The algorithm then propagates the positive and negative po-
larity scores from the seed sets by performing random walks
on the graph. Finally, SENTPROP selects sentiment lexicons
given the resulting polarity scores.
We adapt the SENTPROP framework in several key ways
to induce terms likely to be used in an adversarial manner
towards individual candidates. Broadly, we construct an in-
teraction graph for each individual candidate. Since the like-
lihood of a term being used in an adversarial manner also
depends on the sender of the message, we construct a joint
graph of users and terms interacting with the candidate. Fi-
nally, we initialize the node scores in the graph using a seed
set of users that used explicit adversarial language towards
any candidate.
Constructing a user-term graph. More formally, we cre-
ate a candidate-specific corpus CP for each candidate P
comprising all tweets interacting with the candidate, i.e., all
tweets replying to or mentioning the candidate in our data.
We create the set T of all unigram terms used by at least
10 users, excluding stopwords and candidate names, and the
set U of users who used at least one term from T while in-
teracting with candidate P . We then construct a user-term
graph GP = (V,E) where V = T ∪U . We connect the ver-
tices with edges E = EU ∪EUT ∪ET : a set of connections
between users (EU , {vu2 → vu1 for any user u1 following
u2} on Twitter), between terms (ET , {vt1 → vt2 if t2 is one
of t1’s k nearest neighbours in the word embedding space},
using k = 10), and between users and terms (EUT ) if the
user uses the term in interactions towards the candidate P
({vu ↔ vt for any user who used term t}).
The edge weights among terms, i.e., edges in ET , are set
to the cosine-similarity between their term embeddings, nor-
malized such that the maximum edge weight is 1. The term
embeddings are trained on corpus CP following the method
used in SENTPROP (Hamilton et al. 2016). Edge weights in
EUT are set as the frequency of user u using term t normal-
ized by the frequency of the user interacting with candidate
P . Finally, edge weights in EU are set to 1.
Propagating adversary scores from a seed set of users.
We initialize adversary scores for a seed set of users who
have posted adversarial interactions to any candidate. We
identify such users by taking into account their party prefer-
ence and whether they performed explicit (i.e., detected by
context-agnostic methods) toxic interactions towards candi-
dates of the opposing party. Specifically, we construct two
overall seed sets: UD is a set of all pro-Democrat users in
the dataset who have toxic interactions with any Republi-
can candidate, i.e., interactions labeled with a toxicity score
larger than 0.7 by Perspective API, and analogously a set of
pro-Republican users UR.
Then, for each candidate, we initialize adversary scores
as 1.0 for the seed set of users in favor of the candidate’s
opposing party, e.g., for Republican candidate P we set
UPseed = UP ∩ UD. After the seed set is initialized, we
propagate the adversary scores over the graph using a ran-
dom walk approach (Zhou et al. 2004). A term’s adversary
score towards the candidate is set as the probability of a ran-
dom walk from the seed set reaching that node, normalized
so that the maximum value is 1. Finally, as in (Hamilton et
al. 2016), to ensure robustness of adversary scores, we per-
form label propagation for each candidate 50 times using a
random selection of 70% of the seed nodes each time. The
confidence of term adversary score is defined as the stan-
dard deviation of the computed scores across runs. For most
terms, the adversary score remains stable.
Discovery of adversarial terms. We run the analysis for
the 235 candidates who received at least 800 replies or men-
tions in our data. For the evaluation, we select the 50 term-
candidate pairs with the highest adversary score that result
from these analyses. For each term-candidate pair we sam-
ple 10 tweets that match the pair in order to examine how
these terms are used against these candidates.
Our evaluation shows that a majority of the sampled terms
are indeed used adversarially, with almost half (21 out of
50) of the terms unlikely to be captured by context-agnostic
models. Specifically, our evaluation found that in 15 of the
50 cases it is hard to associate the discovered terms with one
single topic, like “vote” or “people”. We found 14 terms that
are explicitly adversarial, like “lie” or “racist”. Finally, 21
of the 50 terms, in our evaluation, exposed adversarial inter-
actions that used novel language. One example is “Farten-
berry”, from the graph for congressman Jeff Fortenberry, a
Candidate Term Adversary score Sample tweet % of “toxic”
(confidence) tweets
Ammar
Campa-Najjar
terrorist 0.73 (±0.06) @ACampaNajjar Isn’t you grand father a high ranking terrorist or
Taliban member?
35%
Ilhan Omar brother 0.82 (±0.01) @IlhanMN did you and your brother have fun on your honeymoon?? 21%
Duncan Hunter wife 0.99 (±0.01) @Rep Hunter Hey Duncan baby how is your wife? Getting better after
being thrown under the bus?
34%
Lena Epstein rabbi 0.99 (±0.00) @LenaEpstein Are you a stupid person, you had a Christian rabbi to
your event. You suck at being a Jew, you and Jared Kushner are the
worst.
18%
Table 3: Examples of candidate-specific adversarial terms picked up by our method, along with sample tweets containing these
terms. In addition, we show the proportion of tweets being labeled as “toxic” by Perspective API, among all interactions with
the candidate containing the term while coming from a user in favor of the opposing party.
derogatory name used by his opponents. Another discovered
term, “family”, came from the graph for Republican repre-
sentative Paul Gosar, used by opponents to mock the candi-
date whose six siblings endorsed his Democrat opponent.
We show selected samples of candidate-term pairs with
high adversary scores and a tweet containing the term in Ta-
ble 3. The table shows the percentage of the tweets of each
pair – that is all interactions with the candidate containing
the term and posted by users in favor of the opponent party
of the candidate – that were labeled as toxic by Perspec-
tive API. The results show that such content is largely un-
detected by Perspective API. For example, Ammar Campa-
Najjar, whose grandfather was assassinated due to the suspi-
cion that he masterminded the 1972 Munich massacre, was
accused of being a terrorist himself. In total, we found 51
tweets from pro-Republican users interacting with Campa-
Najjar, while referring to the accusation using the term “ter-
rorist”, which is not generally highligheted as adversarial by
context-agnostic approaches. Ilhan Omar, who is falsely ac-
cused of marrying her brother for him to gain permanent res-
idency in the US, received 695 tweets from pro-Republican
users with term “brother”, referring to the alleged incident.
Our approach captures the cases of using misinforma-
tion to undermine the legitimacy of candidates, but adver-
sarial interactions were not limited to misinformation. For
instance, as a consequence of blaming his wife for the charge
of embezzlement, Duncan Hunter received 314 tweets with
the term “wife” criticizing him over the issue. Similarly, be-
cause of inviting a Messianic rabbi to a rally after the Pitts-
burgh synagogue shooting, of 1,945 tweets interacting with
Lena Epstein in our data, 15% criticized her for this incident
(term: “rabbi”).
In conclusion, this informal evaluation shows that the al-
gorithm we developed can discover adversarial interactions
that are missed by context-agnostic methods. In the next sec-
tion, we use some of the tweets and terms from the sample
set we collect, and combine them with previous work on on-
line harassment to provide a typology of adversarial interac-
tions against political candidates.
Discussion: The Many Kinds
of Adversarial Interactions
Using the approach we developed, we were able to dis-
cover samples of more subtle adversarial interactions. In
this section, we provide a typology of adversarial inter-
actions against political candidate, using the types iden-
tified in our work here as well as earlier victim-reported
harassment categories from previous work (Duggan 2017;
Matias et al. 2015). Rather than offer an exhaustive taxon-
omy, we hope to emphasize the challenges facing both accu-
rately annotating and detecting adversarial interactions, by
illustrating these types with examples.
Offensive name-calling. Explicit insults and usage of
abusive language are a common form of harassment on Twit-
ter. Examples often contain terms that are toxic indepen-
dent of the specific victim. Illustrative examples in our dat-
set include “@RepMcCaul Stop using so much water you
ass clown. We’re having a water crisis.” and “@VoteRob-
Davidson You are a joke. #RadicalRob”. Similar utterances
are likely to be perceived as insults in other online forums,
where conversations are often used as training data for ma-
chine learning methods to detect toxicity (Wulczyn, Thain,
and Dixon 2017). In consequence, adversarial interactions
in this category can be detected relatively well via automatic
methods. However, as we show above, offensive name call-
ing in Twitter replies are not always directed towards the
recipient, complicating the analysis.
Threats of violence. Another prominent type of adver-
sarial interaction are tweets that threaten to cause physical
or mental pain. Often, these threats are rather explicit and
thus relatively robust to detect via automated methods, such
as “@RepSwalwell FU MR. Trump! You need someone to
tie you down and torture and rape you. #Deliverance” and
“@Jim Jordan You will burn in hell.”
While some of these threats can be easily detected by
context-agnostic models, others can be implicit and require
context to interpret. For example, a month before mailing
16 bombs to several prominent critics of President Trump,
Cesar Altieri Sayoc Jr. sent the following tweets to Sen-
ator Elizabeth Warren: “@SenWarren @SecretaryZinke A
Promise we will see you real soon. Hug loved one everytime
you leave your home” and “@SenWarren @SecretaryZinke
Nice home in Cambridge see you soon”. Although none of
the bombs were sent to Senator Warren, given the context,
these tweets are likely to have been threats. Without hind-
sight and knowing the identity of the sender of these mes-
sages, they can be interpreted in many different ways. This
use of language poses significant challenges towards auto-
mated threat detection.
Posting discrediting information. A common adversar-
ial tactic in our data involves spreading information with
the aim of discrediting the candidate. This can include both
adversarially posting misinformation and sharing true infor-
mation about a candidate in a hostile way. Alleged scandals
involving candidates, whether or not they are true, are often
used in an adversarial manner. For example, Ilhan Omar has
been falsely accused of marrying her brother. Many tweets
in our dataset referred to this claim, some more explicitly,
e.g. “Weren’t you the one who married your Brother?”, and
others more implicitly, e.g. “Will your brother be there?”.
While we discovered these tweets using our tool for
target-specific adversarial lexicons detection, this category
of adversarial interaction is hard to be accurately detected,
even by humans. Since these attacks are usually tailored to
a specific individual, their detection and interpretation of-
ten requires background knowledge that’s only known to a
small group of people. Even more difficult is differentiat-
ing misinformation from hostile but true information (e.g.
scandals of political candidates). While new approaches are
developed to allow for context in interpreting and labeling
social data (Patton et al. 2020), this remains a challenging
and time-consuming task.
Attacks on identity. Attacks on the basis of attributes
such as race, religion, or gender identity are common. Ex-
amples include misogynist speech, such as “@Ocasio2018
You sexy little tart. . . I don’t do socialism, but I will do you,
you hot little Latina socialist, as long as you don’t talk pol-
itics and you do make me a sandwich afterward. . . ”, hate
speech targeting minority groups like “@RepMaxineWaters
Hey Maxine dont monkey this thing up please”, and other
identity-based attacks.
Correct interpretation of these insults also requires under-
standing of the context, hence making it hard for raters and
automated detection. For example, complementing one’s ap-
pearance is generally not offensive, however repeatedly call-
ing a female politician “hot” in a political discussion is con-
sidered inappropriate, at least in the United States.
Adversarial message repetition. Message repetition is an
effective way to sway an audience (Cacioppo and Petty
1979). We observe cases where adversarial messages or top-
ics that are repeated to amplify their impact in terms of dis-
couraging candidates. Examples include repeating negative
messages, like the user who sent 18 tweets of “this is dis-
gusting, a horror. Resign!” to Nancy Pelosi, or misleading
information, such as made-up scandals.
Classifying this type of adversarial interaction faces sig-
nificant challenges. First, messages expressing legit political
request might as well be repeated multiple times. A care-
ful definition is required to distinguish adversarial repeti-
tion from practise of democracy. Complicating further, iden-
tification of adversarial message repetition requires human
raters to annotate multiple utterances, instead of one utter-
ance alone as is common for most rating tasks.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we analyzed adversarial interactions on Twit-
ter towards political candidates during the run-up to the US
2018 midterm general election. We collected and analyzed a
dataset of 1.7 million tweets. We leveraged the bipartisan na-
ture of US politics to design a method that combines heuris-
tics and context-agnostic language-based algorithms in or-
der to infer the targets of adversarial content on Twitter. This
method allows us to better quantify adversarial interactions
towards candidates. Our findings show that the overall atten-
tion a candidate gets on Twitter is the most indicative factor
of adversarial interactions they receives. Other candidate at-
tributes such as affiliated party or gender have no significant
impact when predicting quantity of adversarial interactions
against a candidate.
While the method we used achieved high precision, we
further explored the type of interactions that are missed by
context-agnostic models. To this end, we developed a novel
algorithm to discover target-specific adversarial lexicons by
combining language and social network features. Our ap-
proach exposes adversarial interactions that are not readily
discovered by context-agnostic generalized language-based
tools. Combining our discovery with victim-reported harass-
ment types, we highlighted the fact that adversarial interac-
tions remains a challenging task for both machine and hu-
man raters, as many types of adversarial interactions require
context and background knowledge to interpret. Although
our method is mainly designed for adversarial interaction
detection, we believe that this “personalized” approach for
detecting challenging language directed at a single individ-
ual could be useful in other tasks, including hate speech or
misinformation detection.
Interactions with political figures and candidates on Twit-
ter (as well as on other public forums) are potentially differ-
ent from the interactions with other public figures. In the
US, for example, the courts have been debating the right
of public officials to block a person from interacting with
their Twitter account (Buchwald 2018), as such behavior
may violate the person’s First Amendment (i.e. free speech)
rights. Regardless of the courts’ final decision, platforms like
Twitter may use the methods we propose here to improve
the detection of adversarial interactions with political fig-
ures. Such detection can foster better discourse around polit-
ical figures, for example by ranking and demoting content,
or by better identifying users who are instigators of toxic
campaigns and environment (Hua, Naaman, and Ristenpart
2020), and devising measures to handle such offenders.
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Appendix I
Full list of politically related hashtags in Table 4.
#bluewave #glovesoff #wherearethechildren #lgbt
#liberal #stillwithher #traitortrump
#fbrparty #resister #resistance #progressive
#flipitblue #strongertogether #trumprussia
#guncontrolnow #fucktrump #neveragain
#gunsense #nevertrump #metoo #gunreformnow
#enough #followbackresistance #gunreform
#muellertime #votethemout #demforce #uniteblue
#pru #impeach45 #voteblue #bluetsunami
#feminist #notmypresident #blm #persist
#bluewave #antitrump #dumptrump #impeachtrump
#protectmueller #familiesbelongtogether
#timesup #theresistance #lgbtq #fbr #democrat
#bluewave2018 #climatechange #takeaknee
#trumptreason #blacklivesmatter #basta
#marchforourlives #resist #boycottnra #daca
#impeach #guncontrol
Filtered #atheist #science #equality #vote #humanrights
#indivisible
#maga #lockherup #tcot #conservative #nra
#thegreatawakening #2a #draintheswamp
#trump2020 #wwg1wga #1a #bluelivesmatter
#wethepeople #maga #kag2020 #prolife
#buildthewall #ccot #fbts #americafirst
#codeofvets #trump #backtheblue #defundpp
#winning #deplorable #magaveteran #redwave
#trumptrain #kag #nodaca #potus #covfefe
#greatawakening #qanon #walkaway #molonlabe
#redwaverising #termlimits
Filtered #godblessamerica #constitution #military #vets
#freedom #usmc #christian #veterans #veteran
#usa #god #codeofvets #vet #israel #family
#jesus #patriot #america
Table 4: Hashtags related to #bluewave or #maga with
filtered ones.
